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\u201eLondon Calling\u201c: Graffiti on the edge of the Big Jungle and a destroyed Bansky mural (Photo: Th. M\u00fcller)<\/em> <\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
Not all of them live in Calais itself, they also use other towns as\nstarting points for the passages to Great Britain: especially Grande-Synthe,\nnear the harbour of Dunkerque, other French, Belgian, Dutch and Spanish ports\nin the reach of highways, and also Paris and Brussels. Thus, Calais is the\ncenter of a broad migration area between (temporarily) the Spanish ports of\nBilbao and Santander in the South West, Luxembourg in the South East, the\nBelgian-German border near Aachen in the East, and Hoek van Holland in the\nNorth. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Calais\u2019 border is – next to the Southern and South Eastern external\nborders of the EU \u2013 the most secrutised in the historic core area of European\nintegration. This border regime has its origins in the fortified expansion of\nthe traffic ways to Great Britain, which started at the turn of the millenium:\nfences, walls, surveillance technology, patrols, restrictions on movement, and\nglacis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
A local Calais newspaper estimates 65 km of new fences since 2015 (2).\nThe effects of this border regime include the documentation of 299 deaths\nbetween 1999 and 2020 (3) \u2013 more than in any border area within the EU. Moreover, the expansion of the border\nfortifications minimized the accessible migration paths and gave way to a\nlucrative market for professional smugglers \u2013 called mafias<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Up to the Brexit the term \u201eexternal border inside\u201c described the\nsituation well. Since then the British Channel literally has become an external\nEU border \u2013 however, an external border exclusively for the prevention of\nemigration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Just as the EU has extended its external border into its geographical\nforefield, e.g. to North Africa, and uses the sea as a natural barrier, Great\nBritain has also externalized its combat of migration into French territory;\nthe Channel functions hereby as a small version of the Mediterranean Sea. In\nboth places this does not bring about the end of migration but it forces\nmigrants to stay longer in border areas and to search for remaining migration\npaths: risky and expensive. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And this is how the first provisional camps in Calais were established in\nthe late 1990s. With the expansion of these temporary camps, a story began\nwhich should get international attention as the\nJungle of Calais<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Big Jungle of Calais<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The term Jungle was created in the late 2000 years. It has its roots in\n\u201edjangal\/dzhangal\u201c, a Pashtu word for the large camps in forests back then.\nToday it is still used for numerous camps, mostly large, complex or\nmultiethnic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n While several hundred persons – sometimes even up to over one thousand –\nlived in the past jungles<\/em>, one\nparticular camp (established through governmental interventions) within a short\nperiod of time grew into a settlement made of tents, shacks and containers for\nseveral thousand inhabitants. One and a half years later it contained over\n10.000 people. Many of them had become homeless during their asylum process in\nFrance or while hoping to get accession to the French asylum system. <\/p>\n\n\n\n While the authorities called the settlement \u201eLa Lande\u201c (after the\nlandfill site it was located on), it became publicly known as the epitome of The<\/em> Jungle\nof Calais<\/em>; also the retrospective term \u201eBig Jungle\u201c describes its high\ndynamics (4). <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Big Jungle contained several institutions installed by the\nGovernment: a center with accession to meals, electricity and sanitary units\n(no accomodation though), an area to accomodate women and underaged youths as\nwell as a container camp for persons aiming for accession to the French asylum\nsystem. The large part of the inhabitants lived in the \u201einformal\u201c but\ngovernment-\u201etolerated\u201c area though in which the authorities had prepared only\nsimple infrastructure with a water point, a washing place, mobile toilets, garbage\nbins and street lanterns. They also tried to establish a sort of indirect\nmanagement. This dual structure of official camp and wild camp resembled the\ncamp of Moria prior to the fire in September 2020. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Most of the inhabitants of the Jungle provided for themselves or were\nsupported by local civic organisations, professional NGOs as well as a large\ngroup of initiatives that were established spontaneously. <\/p>\n\n\n\n That way informal businesses, infrastructures and institutions were\ncreated: such as 70 restaurants, shops, cafes and other commercial enterprises,\nseveral mosques and churches as well as several informal schools, institutions\nfor kids, recreation and culture, legal counselling, medical and psychological\ncontact points, and a protected area for women and families with children. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Such diverse systems had already existed in other jungles and squats but\nthe Calais jungle exceeded them in complexity and density. This development can\nbe understood as a process of urbanisation, as the beginning of a\ntransformation of the Big Jungle into a migrant city in the heart of Europe.\nMigrant researcher Michel Agier and architect Cyrille Hanappe analysed the\nconception of the Jungle as a city, they classified it into the global context\nof informal urbanisation and defended it as an alternative to hermetic camp\nstructures. (5)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Big Jungle was simultaneously an eminent political place. Already\nits location next to the access road to the ferry port meant that most ferry\npassengers must have caught a glimpse of it at the peak of the \u201eEuropean\nmigration crisis\u201c. Countless journalists \u2013 including the aggressive British\ntabloids \u2013 visited the Jungle but were more and more considered as a burden by\nits inhabitants: \u201eWe are not animals, and the Jungle is not a zoo!\u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time many political, educational, religious, cultural, artistic,\nmedia and academic initiatives involved the Junge into their networks – and\nturned it to a reference point and laboratory of civil society action. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The activist and artist Zimako Mel Jones suggested to use the name\n\u201eforum\u201c instead of Jungle due to the colonial and racist connotations and\nbecause it had become a public place. <\/p>\n\n\n\n All of this does not relativise that the living conditions in the Jungle\nat that time were precarious. There was constant lack of supply, economical and\nsexualised exploitation as well as crime, including murder. There was\ncollective violence, for example when in May 2016 a large Sudanese area was burned\ndown by a group of Afghan inhabitants, without the French police intervening. <\/p>\n\n\n\n These problems are reflected in a number of surveys by the British\ninitiative Refugee rights Europe<\/em> who\nasked the inhabitants about their experiences with violence and fear. In these\nquestionings it became obvious that people were mainly afraid of the police and\noften had experienced police violence themselves. (6)<\/p>\n\n\n\n These human rights abuses by the police \u2013 especially by the omnipresent Compagnies R\u00e9publicaines de S\u00e9curit\u00e9<\/em>\n(CRS) \u2013 have been and still are documented and denounced by activists (7),\ninternational NGOs (8)and official authorities, such as the D\u00e9fenseur des droits <\/em>(9).However,\nthey take place unabated. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This review of the Big Jungle is essential to comprehend the situation\nafter its evacuation in October 2016: The authorities had created this place consciously\nto remove the migrants from the public space of the city, to dissolve their\nscattered living places and instead, to gather them all in one place 7 km away\nfrom the city. However, they had not anticipated the attraction and dynamics, which\nthe Big Jungle would unfold. Its evacuation became a giant, logistical\noperation: A large number of the inhabitants was taken to special Reception and\nOrientation centres (Centre d\u2019accueil et\nd\u2019orientation<\/em>; CAO,) which had been installed almost all over France,\nexcept around Calais. A part of the unaccompanied underaged having relatives in\nGreat Britain as well as those who fulfilled the additional age and nationality\ncriteria were allowed to legally enter Great Britain for a while. The British\ngovernment withdrew this option shortly after. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Since the evacuation the police focusses on the challenge of so-called\nfixation points (points de fixation<\/em>).\nThis term describes places of recently constructed camps which are urgently and\ncontinuously cleared: The police take or destroy the tents, cover other\npersonal belongings, leading to constant stress, insecurity and lack of sleep\nfor the affected persons. These early and constant evacuations make it legally impossible\nto achieve provisional tolerance. The aim is to prevent a second Big Jungle. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Calais as \u201ea hostile\nenvironment\u201c<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The British Home Office Minister and later Prime Minister Theresa May\ncoined the term \u201ehostile environment,\u201c which was to be created for \u201eillegal\nmigrants\u201c. (10)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The implementation of these claims on French territory represents how the\nFrench authorities clamped down on the \u201efixation points\u201c. <\/p>\n\n\n\n It was to be expected that the destruction of the Big Jungle did not end\nthe migration events in Calais. During the winter after the evacuation several\nhundred people – who had returned to Calais or who were new there – lived\nunprotected under bridges in the town centre, under balconies, in parks and\neven on sidewalks. By maintaining their tactics against the \u201efixation points,\u201c\nthe police did not tolerate tents and\ncovers so that people had to carry their sleeping bags and<\/em> thermofoils\naround with them. During the same winter of 2017, the conservative mayor\nNatacha Bouchart ceased the help of humanitary organisations. When she\ngrotesquely tried to prevent the Secours\nCatholique<\/em> from providing shower cabins by blocking the road to their\nsocial centre with garbage<\/em> containers,\nthe story was shown all over the French media.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the following years, initially the number of migrants increased to\n400-700 in Calais with less in Grande-Synthe and Brussels. Very slowly, tiny\ncamps came up as well as meeting points where Civil Society organisations\nprovided meals, groceries and organised medical and legal help. Attempts of the\nauthorities to block this help ended in legal disputes: The French High Court\nconfirmed the inhumanity of the living conditions in Calais and obliged the\nauthorities to provide accommodation and basic humanitarian supplies. On this\nbasis the \u201cPrefecture\u201d gave orders to the humanitarian organisation La vie active<\/em> (they had run the social\ncenter and container camp in the Big Jungle) to provide drinking water, meals\nand sanitary units. Moreover, voluntary transfers to special accommodation were\norganized. (Centres d_accueil et d\u2019Examen\ndes Situation, CAES.<\/em>) These were located outside of Calais, like the CAOs. As\na result of these transfers, a special type of alleged humanitary evacuation\ndeveloped: during these mise \u00e0 l\u2019abri<\/em>\noperations the inhabitants of the camps were taken by force to a CAES; afterwards\ntheir tents were taken away and when they returned thereafter they found\nthemselves in an even worse situation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Up to 2018 a meeting point with several small camps existed in the\nindustrial zone Zone des dunes<\/em>. Since\nthe 1990s this area had been the setting for many migration events of Calais. It\nwas located near the harbour and included numerous infrastructures of truck\ntraffic, which were mostly later closed. Also, the Big Jungle had been located\nright next to the Zone des dunes<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n After this meeting point was evacuated in March 2019, the area was shut off\nwith a massive fence. Later it became clear that this had initiated the fencing\nof all areas in the Zone des Dunes and the surrounding forests up until\n2020. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the meantime, La vie active<\/em>\nestablished a spot with drinking water, meals and sanitary units on Rue des\nHuttes, a street at the other end of the Zone\ndes Dunes<\/em>, close to the former Big Jungle. Around this point migrants of\nvarious nationalities built up several new camps during 2019-20, which took up\na considerable area and were called the New Jungle. The number of migrants\nincreased to more than 1000, most of them lived in the Jungle. Some others\nlived in smaller camps, e.g. on wasteland at the Calais hospital. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Police acts against the \u201efixation points \u201cdid not cease but changed\nin character: Additionally the Jungle and the other camps were evacuated almost\nevery 48 hours now. During these absurd operations officials searched these areas,\nfrom which the inhabitants moved their tents and restablished themselves and\ntheir belongings a few meters further or into the next street \u2013 in order to\nreturn after the officials had left. Two days later this procedure was repeated.\nContinuously repeating, this prevented longterm settlements and infrastructure\nas it had existed in the Big Jungle. It also made sure that the migrants lived\nunder precarious living conditions and experienced a routine of continuous\nhumiliation. For the years of 2019 and 2020 Human\nRights Observers<\/em> registered 961 resp. 973 evacuations in Calais being\ncarried out in that way. (11)<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n On 10 and 11 July the French Minister of the Interior G\u00e9rald Darmanin\ngave an order to evacuate the New Jungle and fence it off afterwards. (12) This\nevacuation was one of the first symbolic actions by the conservative minister\nand set up the stage for a meeting with his British colleague Priti Patel in\nCalais on 12 July; their main topic was how to combat clandestine boat\npassages. <\/p>\n\n\n\n A group of migrants settled on the wasteland at the hospital but the\nHospital Jungle was also evacuated on 29 September 2020. (13)<\/p>\n\n\n\n After that the authorities kept an eye on the area of Forts Nieulay at\nthe other end of Calais. (14) There, migrants tried to hide in trucks stuck in\ntraffic jams (pre-Brexit). <\/p>\n\n\n\n G\u00e9rald Darmamin also banned the supply of food in certain areas of\nCalais if not under the authority of the government. (15) La vie active<\/em> was the only organisation allowed to help everywhere\nin Calais. At first this ban was lifted on 11 September 2020 and has been continuously\nextended geographically since then. Providing or not providing humanitarian aid\nnow served to put pressure on the 700 migrants in Calais and to regulate their\npresence in the diverse parts of the city. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Corona pandemic has not changed the situation of\nthe migrants. (16) During the two confinements, the authorities informed the\ninhabitants of the camps about social distancing, hygiene rules and curfews but\nthey continued to destroy tents and take away personal belongings. Massive Police\nviolence was also documented during that phase, such as the head injury of an\nEritrean man from a rubber bullet (17). At the same time the authorities used\nthe curfews to prevent the documentation of those operations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Soon it became obvious that the authorities in Calais\nwere not prepared for the pandemic: They could not provide accommodation and the\ncivil society organisations were left alone. The evacuation of the first\ninhabitants of the Jungle was planned for 31 March but did not happen after 5\ncases of infection. In April voluntary and limited housing was provided in a\nnewly established shelter outside of Calais with a capacity of 450 places. After\na short time some people returned from there. Meanwhile the confinement\nresulted in a breakdown of the meals supply, which led to hunger. Therefore,\nthe civil society organisations provided wood and groceries for cooking while La vie active<\/em> provided lunch packages. <\/p>\n\n\n\n From Grande-Synthe, where the Authorities handled the\nsituation in a similar way, disastrous physical conditions were reported at the\nbeginning of the pandemic. During the second autumn confinement the Prefecture reestablished\nhousing as well as search groups for obviously sick persons. By the end of the\nyear 2020 there were no more supply problems comparable to those in spring. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The establishment of\nthe Channel route<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In the past 20 years many people have tried to cross\nthe Channel both in small boats and by swimming. The movie Welcome<\/em> from 2009 examines this issue, presenting a young man who\nafter intense training tries to swim to England and dies. Nevertheless, until\n2018 freight traffic was the most important migration path to Great Britain.\nSingle migrants or small groups tried to hide in, on or under trucks or trains.\nStarting points were mainly gas stations or resting areas. With increasing\npolicing of the traffic routes these areas were closed, moved or fenced in. On\nthe one hand, groups of smugglers and commercial traffickers adopted access to\nsuch places and claimed money from the migrants; on the other hand, the\nactivities at the motorways moved further inland, e.g. to the motorway\nBrussels-Oostende, towards Li\u00e8ge and Luxembourg. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Another migration technique is the use of traffic jams\nat the access roads to the Channel and to the harbours – or the creation of\ntraffic jams by placing obstacles or by running onto the road. The most\ndangerous method was jumping from bridges onto moving trucks. Over and over\nagain people were injured or died on the roads, on railway facilities and in\ncargo compartments: these being the most prevalent causes of death among those\ndocumented. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Such methods mean many unsuccessful and risky attempts\nover a long period of time and often payments of several hundred Euros. The\nalternative is commercial trafficking, for example with the help of cooperating\ntruck drivers and costs of around 5000 Euros. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In October 2018 a new development arose which would\nunfold a similarly acute dynamic like the Big Jungle had done until October\n2016: the boat passages increased. At first mainly Iranian migrants crossed the\nChannel: They had come by plane via Serbia and had not yet been traumatised by\nany boat passage. They used motorised dinghy boats , either legally bought or\nstolen. They were prepared for the passages organized by commercial traffickers\nin return for a payment of 3000-5000 Euros, or were self-organized in small\ngroups. The French authorities reacted quickly by complicating the sales of\nboats and accessories such as life jackets and by encouraging the public to\nreport possible preparations of such passages. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The exact number of boat passages varies in the\ndifferent official sources. Fact is that 2018 about 300 people reached Great\nBritain by boat, around 90% between October and December with a first peak\nduring the Christmas holidays. Following that, British tabloids and politicians\nstarted a populist campaign and depicted the arrival of this small group of\nrefugees as an \u201cinvasion\u201d and therefore addressed an effective narrative of\nBritish nationalism. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Home Office Minister of the time, Sajid Javid,\ndeclared the boat passages as a \u201cmajor incident\u201d and ordered two Border Force patrol\nboats from the Mediterranean to the Channel while the Ministry of Defense\nprepared a battleship for the time until their arrival. (18)<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 24 January 2019, Javid and his French equivalent Mr\nChristophe Castaner signed a Joint Action Plan […] on combatting illegal\nmigration involving small boats in the English Channel <\/em>[19] in London. This\nplan regulated the cooperation of both countries during both search- and rescue\nand air patrol operations. Great Britain provided funds for patrols at sea, on\nthe beaches and in coastal regions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, the plan aimed for the quick deportation of\na possibly high number of migrants to France. Since then, British politics has\npulled through the idea of deterring future boat passengers via direct\ndeportation. This concept would later be radicalised by Javid\u2019s successor Priti\nPatel, who demanded pushbacks at sea. <\/p>\n\n\n\n During 2019 the boat passages were the most effective\nmigration path: Between 1800 and 2000 boat passages succeeded, many more than\nthe year before. A major incident happened at the start: on 2 March 2019 about\n100-200 inhabitants of the Jungle stormed the site of the Calais Ferry Port and\npartly made it onto a ferry. This event was neither documented by journalists\nnor by local activists. While the Authorities blamed the smugglers, a Jungle\nactivist described it to us as political protest, during which the people had\ntaken the spontaneous chance to board an open ferry. According to him, some\npeople had faced death by falling into the rough sea, others had made it to\nEngland \u2013 contrary to the reports of the Authorities. This event is relevant\nbecause at one of its most controlled places people were able to break through\nthe Border regime in a collective activity, even if only partly. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Between 8400- 8700 people reached Great Britain in\nsmall boats during 2020: making a total of almost 11.000 since 2018. Even if\nthis only makes up a small part of Immigration to Great Britain (45.000 asylum\nrequests were submitted in 2020), the externalised border has never been undermined\nso frequently. British media has reported new monthly and daily records almost\nevery month, with a high of just under 2000 successful passages in September meaning\n416 passengers in 28 boats on September 2nd. At the same time the number of the\nmonthly passages exceeded those of the month before. At the start mostly\nIranian migrants had travelled by boat, however now those from various\ncountries such as Jemen and several Western African countries also used boat\npassages. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The most likely reason for the increase of the Channel\nroute is probably the extraordinarily high chance of success at a relatively\nlow risk. All the available data show: More than half of the passages, maybe\neven 70%, were successful. Also, there is a strong chance of a right to stay in\nGreat Britain after the asylum procedure. At the same time, the risk of death\nby boat during the journey is lower than in the Mediterranean, on on trucks or\ntrains. Further reasons for the rise of boat passages may be the reduced\nfreight traffic during the first wave of the Corona pandemic as well as the good\nspring weather in 2020. The passageways are also popular because of the\ntopography of the French Channel coast: a secret departure is easier within 150\nkms between Boulogne-sur-Mer and Dunkerque because to monitor this area would\nrequire a great deal of patrol and manpower. <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, local Calais papers reported weekly of saving\nmigrants who had often gotten into mortal danger directly after their departure.\nMoreover, the dense Channel boat traffic, strong currents, fog and the cold\ntemperature carry risks. Especially if people use inflatable boats for\nchildren, self-designed boats made of surfboards, or if they swim. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n 13 cases of death (20) were reported between 2018-2020:\non 9 August 2019 the Iranian student Mitra Mahrad fell into the sea during a\nrescue operation and drowned. On 18 August 2019 the body of Niknam Massoud from\nIraq was found at the Belgian Offshore windpark Thorntonback. Massoud had tried\nto cross the Channel on a construction made of plastic bottles. On 14 October 2019\nthe bodies of Hussein Mufaq Hussein and Soran Jamal Jalal were found in Le\nTouquet, after having an accident in a rubber boat. On 5 September 2020 the\nnewborn baby Aleksandra H. died of anoxia after her pregnant mother was\narrested before the departure. As the mother wrote in an open letter in 2021, she\nhad not received any medical help for hours; later the baby died in hospital, after\nan emergency birth had to be induced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 19 August 2020 Abdulfatah Hamdallah was found dead\non the beach of Sangatte near Calais. He wanted to cross the Channel with a\nfriend who survived, in a children\u2019s boat with shovels as oars. On 18 October\n2020 the body of Behzad Bagheri-Parvin from Iran, who wanted to cross alone, was\nfound in Sangatte. The biggest accident happened on 27 October 2020 at\nLoon-Plage when 7 Kurdish Iraqis from the camps in Grande-Synthe drowned: among\nthem the family of Rasul Iran Nezhad and Shiva Mohammad Panahi and their\nchildren Anita (9), Armin (6) and Artin (15 months). <\/p>\n\n\n\n These cases of death were instrumentalised on a\nregular basis by the British government in order to claim a closure of the\nChannel route and to legitimate the border regime. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Channel\nmigrants<\/em> became the main subject of the British national politics during\nthe summer of 2020. The rightwing politician Nigel Farage crossed the Channel\nto document the alleged invasion of the island. On the British Channel coast\nsmall right wing extremist groups patrolled. British lawyers, who intervened\nagainst deportation, became targets of media and political campaigns. A lawyer\nwas attacked with a knife on 7 September. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, however, the boats became reference\npoints of solidarity politics – reflected in the initiatives Watch the Channel<\/em> and Channel Rescue<\/em>. The latter aims at\nproviding a private ship to document the activities of government authorities\nin the Channel, especially pushbacks, and to give first aid in case of need. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Several British media reported that the British Home Office\nconsidered carrying out pushbacks at sea, to stop boats from entering British\nwaters through a swimming barrier in the middle of the Channel or even by using\na wave machine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This scenario also included faraway places where successful boat\npassengers were to be interned, comparable with the Australian \u201cPacific\nsolution\u201d, on islands in the South Pacific or former oil platforms. This shows\nthe radicalisation process of British migration politics, however extremely\ndistorted it was: a \u201cborder regime on steroids\u201d (21) as journalist Tobias\nM\u00fcller called it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile the British Government negotiated further\nbilateral measures with France. Great Britain applied, according to its own\nreports, great pressure on France to get its approval accepted for pushbacks at\nsea. It failed because France doubted their legality. <\/p>\n\n\n\n When Patel and Darmamin signed another deal in Calais\non 22 July 2020 \u2013 after the evacuation of the Jungle -, it only regulated the \u201ccreation of a Franco-British intelligence unit on the issue of\nmigration\u201c[22]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The agreement supplemented existing structures of Border\nPolice cooperation and included the use of 12 additional officials. A new\nagreement of 28 November 2020 went further. (23) It pledged French payments of\n31,4 million Euros and aimed at doubling the French land patrols between\nBoulogne, Calais and Dunkerque as well as increasing the capacity of\nprosecution and new technical gear (\u201erolling out a new\nwave of cutting-edge surveillance and detention technology\u201c, \u201eincluding drones,\nradar equipment, optronic binoculars and fixed cameras\u201c) to identify boats\nbefore their departure. Patel said the aim was \u201eto eliminate the small boats\nphenomenon\u201d \u2013 hence closure of the complete Channel route. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Slowly the sea border was militarised, including\nnational British and bilateral measures. The British migration researchers Thom\nTyerman and Travis Van Isacker sum up this development in October 2020: <\/p>\n\n\n\n The main thinking manifests itself, according to them<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c (\u2026) above all in the obvious militarisation of the\nChannel under ex-marine Dan O\u2019Mahoney in the new role of Clandestine Channel\nThreat Commander. A fleet of coastal patrol ships from the border police and\ncustoms ships coordinate with colleagues from French prosecution authorities on\nboth sides of the Channel to stop the boats as soon as possible.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n French marine warships are used when Royal Navy and\nBorder Force perform training. Drones from the private defense company Tekever\n(soon to be replaced by Elbit) and from the Ministry of Defence make constant\nair patrol possible next to the use of Royal Air Force planes. A video of the Home\nOffice shows: The footage is used to criminalise refugees and to sentence\ntravellers who steer their boats for \u201cenabling illegal entrance\u201c. (24)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Great Britain\nsimultaneously tried to compensate the failure of the pushback agreement with\nFrance by forcing the deportation of Channel crossers. Under the name \u201cOperation\nSillath\u201d the Home Office prepared collective deportations of Channel crossers\nto France, Germany, Italy, Spain and other third countries. The initiative\nCorporate Watch states (25) that prior to the deportations access to legal\nmeasures had been complicated. Those affected repeatedly defended themselves\nthrough self-injury and suicide attempts against deportation – which eventually\ntook place by force and with a grotesque amount of security personnel. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In some cases, lawyers\nsucceeded in stopping deportation flights at the last minute. The deportations\nwere carried out according to EU Dublin regulations. However, they had only been valid for Great Britain\nuntil the end of the Brexit transition phase on 31 December 2020. Probably only\na fraction of the announced \u201cSillath\u201d deportations were realized. The\ndiscouraging effect on potential boat passengers probably never happened. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u201chostile environment\u201d\nconcept was still relevant, also within Great Britain. A good example is the\naccommodation of more than 600 Channel crossers in two former Barracks starting\nin Autumn 2020. (26) The Penally Barracks near Walisian Tenby as well as the\nNapier Barracks near Folkstone have been in the news for absolutely\ninsufficient conditions. A report by the British Red Cross states that, based\non interviews in the Penally Barracks, military facilities are completely\ninappropriate for the many refugees with traumatic experiences. The Napier Barracks\nsituation soon became serious: several protests and hunger strikes happened within\n4 months as well as suicide attempts and a major fire. Moreover, these kinds of\naccommodations do not fulfil sanitary, medical standards and social\ndistancing-rules cannot be applied: in early 2020 there was one Covid outbreak,\nfollowed by more than 120 infected persons. (of 415). <\/p>\n\n\n\n According to statements of\nKent Refugee Action Network, following social distancing-rules would have only\nbeen possible at an occupancy of up to 150 people. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Channel route will\ncontinue to be frequented. Its militarisation will probably expand the market\nfor commercial traffickers and also encourage people to use improvised means to\ncross \u2013 as e.g. Abdulfatah Hamdallah and his toy boat and Niknak\nMassoud with his plastic bottle construction. If the density of patrols between\nBoulogne, Calais and Dunkerque causes geographical relocation, the boats will\nhave to travel longer and therefore a more dangerous distance. More hideouts in\ntrucks will also increase the risk of deaths. \u201cFar from preventing boat\npassages, saving lives or ending exploitation, this kind of border militarisation\n(\u2026) has the opposite effect\u201d, Tyerman and Van Isacker conclude.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The border regime\nand Brexit<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In the past years there was a lot of speculation about\nthe effect Brexit would have on migrants in Calais. In particular, it was\nexpected that more Border and Customs controls at the Ports and at the Channel Tunnel\nwould lead to enormous traffic jams on the motorways – which would offer good\nmigration opportunities and at the same time legitimise more policing of the\ntraffic ways. <\/p>\n\n\n\n After the agreement of a Transition Phase between the\nactual EU-exit on 31 January 2020 and 31 December 2020 the possible effects of\nthe Brexit were postponed to the beginning of 2021. However in expectation of a\nno-deal-scenario, there was already increased freight traffic from October 2020\nas companies wanted to avoid possible customs charges, bureaucratic processes\nand supply shortfall by building up stocks. The expected traffic jams in Calais\nreally happened from October until December 2020 and refugees used them for\ntheir journeys. Near Fort Nieulay, a historic fort close to the access road to Motorway\nA 16 towards the loading facillities of the Channel Tunnel, migrants built\ncamps as a starting point for this migration path. The Authorities responded\nwith evacuations and above all, with physical violence, CS gas and the use of\ndogs on the migrants, seen on or near the motorway. (28) On 19 November the\nyoung Sudanese Mohamed Khamisse Zakaria died. His friends later stated:\n\u201c\u201eMohamed died hit by a car while he was trying to escape the police gas from\nthe back of a truck, vehicle of his desire to reach England as soon as\npossible.\u201c[29] <\/p>\n\n\n\n What does the Brexit\nmean for the border regime? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Looking into its history shows that it is based less\non European Law than on bilateral agreements between Great Britain and France complemented\nby agreements with Belgium, as required. In addition, the border regime (until\n2009) was designed for migration via traffic infrastructure ashore but not for\nsea passages. It is clear no one expected that the Channel route would become\nestablished. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The historical starting point of the bilateral\nagreements was the development of the Channel Tunnel: for the first time a\n\u201cdry\u201d border under water. Both countries handled the forefield control of this\nnew border before the Tunnel access roads of the other country via The Treaty\nof Canterbury of 12 February 1986 (30) \u2013 thus\nthe externalisation of the British controls on French territory and the other\nway round. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Prior to the opening of the Tunnel the Protocol of\nSangatte of 25 November 1991 (31) regulated the exact process for the shuttle\ntrains. An additional protocol of Sangatte from 25 May 2000 (32) and the treaty\nof Le Touquet (4 February 2003) (33) extended the controls to the departure\nstations of the Eurostar trains in Calais, Paris and Lille resp. to the French\nferry ports on the Channel and North Sea coasts. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At the trilateral meeting on 26 September 2002 in\nZeebrugge the Belgian ports and the departure station of the Eurostar trains in\nBrussels were added to this system. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Starting with the Ferry Port in Calais, the\nfortification of the traffic facilities began in 2000, their costs have mainly\nbeen borne by Great Britain. At the French-British summit in Evian on 7 July\n2009 an administrative arrangement (34) was concluded: it aimed at the\ninstitutionalisation of border police cooperation in order to combat migration\nand to investigate smugglers. Subsequently a structure of corporate contact\npoints, communication platforms and operative units was created with direct\ncommunication channels to the Home Secretaries and new funding mechanisms. The strategic coordination was enormous even\nin allegedly insignificant areas as different corporate statements of the years\nafter 2014 show, especially the paper Managing Migratory Flows in Calais <\/em>(25\nAugust 2015) [35] from the time of the Big Jungle. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the context of the negotiations about Great\nBritain\u2019s exit agreement with the EU both countries confirmed all these\nagreements signing the Treaty of Sandhurst on 18 January 2018 (36). The Treaty\nextended the corporate field of action and interpreted it as an element of a\nmuch broader \u201cborder management\u201d \u2013 with a great number of security functions\nfrom the security of the vital traffic flows as far as terrorism combat. Until\nthis date the agreements focused exclusively on land. The agreements after 2019\nto fight boat passages present an extension of the terrestrial border regime\nbut continue to include measures offshore, as shown above. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The border regime is not immediately affected by the Brexit\nsince it is based on such intergovernmental agreements. However, the\ntransformation of a border within Europe into a EU-border affects migrants\nindirectly. Therefore, British politics towards the Channel migrants can be both\ninterpreted as a reaction to the development of the Channel route and also as a\npre-arrangement for post Brexit times. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Another effect of Brexit on the border can be seen in\na traffic management plan of the French authorities (37). In order to relieve access\nroads to the ferry ports at the crucial phase of traffic jams, the trucks were\nalready controlled ahead and stopped at less key parts of the motorway. \u201cIntelligent\u201d,\ndigitalized border technologies are required for this new placement of freight\ncontrol – and their implementation is encouraged by the Brexit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The biggest influence will probably be in the British\nasylum law. In December 2020 the government compensated the upcoming omission\nof Dublin deportations by modifying the process regulations of British asylum law (38). It established a\nbasis in order to exclude Channel crossers and other immigrating migrants from\nthe European mainland from the asylum system and to even deport them to Third Countries\nwhich they had not even entered. However, as the mandatory agreements with the\nthird countries are missing, this revision initially only weakens the legal\nstatus of the migrants in their asylum procedure. However, it is expected that\nGreat Britain will try to negotiate a system of corresponding re-admission\nagreements with France and other EU-countries. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n Concerning the boat passages, the British Government\nhad addressed the nationalist narrative of a loss of control over the border\nand painted the picture of a \u201cbroken\u201d asylum system. This rhetoric corresponded\nto conservative Brexiteers\u2019 thinking. Now the closure of the Channel route and\nthe revision of the asylum system – as Brexit itself – appeared as acts to\nregain national sovereignty. Patel\u2019s statements on the alleged migration crisis\nin the Channel were full of announcements of a radically modified asylum law\nfor the post-Brexit era. What exactly such a future asylum law would consist of\nand what it means for the Calais camps, is not yet clear. However, it is likely\nthat the production of a \u201chostile environment\u201d in the French border area will remain\na secret and an inhumane but essential core element of the \u201cborder management\u201d.\nThe border will continue to expand but it will not stop migration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n ———–<\/p>\n\n\n\n Footnotes:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n (1) Numerous mostly French and English publications focus on that. A\ngood overview: <\/p>\n\n\n\n Michel Agier et al: La Jungle de Calais, Les migrants,\nla fronti\u00e8re et le camp, Paris, PUF, 2018 (engl.: The Jungle, Calais\u2019 camps and\nmigrants, Cambridge, Polity, 2019; dt.: Der \u201eDschungel von Calais\u201c, \u00dcber das\nLeben in einem Fl\u00fcchtlingslager, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2020). An inevitable electronic\nsource fort he time after 2015 is this blog: https:\/\/passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [2] https:\/\/www.lavoixdunord.fr\/920400\/article\/2021-01-15\/calaisis-pour-empecher-les-intrusions-de-migrants-de-nouvelles-grilles-posees<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [3] The cases\nof death are systematically documented by the group GISTI. 296 cases of death\nare listed for fall 2020. https:\/\/irr.org.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/11\/Deadly-Crossings-Final.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n After its\npublication 2 more cases of death became known in 2020. Plus, in early 2021 a\ndead body was found in the port of Calais. It was strongly decayed, and\nprobably a migrant, therefore counted for 2020. There is probably a high number\nof unreported cases. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [4] Besides the\nalready mentioned book by Michel Agier, see also: Samuel Lequette \/ Delphine Le\nVergos (Hrsg.): D\u00e9camper, De Lampedusa \u00e0 Calais, un livre de textes et d\u2019images\n& un disque pour parler d\u2019une terre sans accueil, Paris, La D\u00e9couverte,\n2016; Marie Godin et al: Voices from the Jungle, Stories from the Calais\nregugee camp, London, Pluto Press, 2017; Thomas M\u00fcller \/ Uwe Schl\u00fcper:\nDynamiken der Jungles, Calais und das europ\u00e4isch-britische Grenzregime,\nM\u00fcnchen: bordermonitoring, 2018; Dan Hicks \/ Sarah Mallet: La Lande, The Calais\n\u201aJungle\u2018 and Boyond, Bristol, Bristol University Press, 2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Re solidary\npolitics compared to Athen-Calais, see also: Natasha\nKing: No borders, The politics of immigration control and resistance, London,\nZed Books, 2016. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [5] See Agier\net al. a.a.O., p. 129-133, 195-199; See also Thomas M\u00fcller u. Sascha Zinflou:\nDie Urbanit\u00e4t des Jungle, Calais und die M\u00f6glichkeit einer migrantischen Stadt,\nin; movements 2\/2018, p. 129-160. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [6] https:\/\/refugee-rights.eu\/reports\/the-long-wait<\/a> and https:\/\/refugee-rights.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/RRE_UnsafeBorderlands.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n See also: https:\/\/refugee-rights.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/RRE_StillWaiting.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/refugee-rights.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/RRE_StillHere.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/refugee-rights.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/RRE_TwelveMonthsOn.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [7] https:\/\/helprefugees.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/Police-Harrassment-of-Volunteers-in-Calais-1.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n http:\/\/www.laubergedesmigrants.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/06\/Les-Expulsions-de-Terrain-a-Calais-et-a-Grande-Synthe-FR-2.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n http:\/\/www.laubergedesmigrants.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/HRO-eng-rep2019.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [8] See also reports by Human Rights Watch https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/report\/2017\/07\/26\/living-hell\/police-abuses-against-child-and-adult-migrants-calais<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n and Amnesty International https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/download\/Documents\/EUR2103562019ENGLISH.PDF<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [9] https:\/\/www.defenseurdesdroits.fr\/fr\/rapports\/2015\/10\/exiles-et-droits-fondament-aux-la-situation-sur-le-territoire-de-calais<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/juridique.defenseurdesdroits.fr\/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=18378&opac_view=1<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/www.defenseurdesdroits.fr\/fr\/rapports\/2018\/12\/exiles-et-droits-fondament-aux-trois-ans-apres-le-rapport-calais<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n https:\/\/defenseurdesdroits.fr\/sites\/default\/files\/atoms\/files\/cp_ddd_24-09-2020-visi\nte-calais-clairehedon_0.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [10] See Corporate Watch: The UK Border Regime, A\ncritical guide, London, Freedom Press, 2018, S. 23ff. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [11] Human\nRights Observers observe the situation constantly according to a scheme: short\nreports are published on Twitter about each evacuation. Also, the group\npresents monthly and yearly reports. <\/p>\n\n\n\n http:\/\/www.laubergedesmigrants.fr\/fr\/publications-hro\/?fbclid=IwAR3o-RoH2sAFKZ1A1JuiGt8IcHCP9VlU79nxaz_uEqrTPQEiovmXhbzG6h4<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [12] https:\/\/calais.bordermonitoring.eu\/2020\/07\/20\/rekonstuktion-einer-raeumungswoche\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [13] https:\/\/calais.bordermonitoring.eu\/2020\/09\/30\/neue-dimension-von-raeumungen\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [14] https:\/\/calais.bordermonitoring.eu\/2020\/12\/26\/kampf-um-plaetze-2\/#more-1673<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [15] https:\/\/calais.bordermonitoring.eu\/2020\/09\/15\/cest-lhonneur-de-la-france\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n [16] Compare\ninterview with activist Maya Konforti: https:\/\/calais.bordermonitoring.eu\/2020\/05\/15\/whats-happening-is-crazy-its-inhum\nane-it-doesnt-work-but-its-going-to-continue\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n as well as the survey https:\/\/calais.bordermonitoring.eu\/2020\/10\/11\/analyse-zum-einfluss-der-pandemie-auf-die-lage-der-exilierten\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n and the blog https:\/\/calais.bordermonitoring.eu\/2020\/11\/14\/zweite-welle-ein-lagebericht\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/peopleandspomeniks.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/BigJungle-min-768x576-1.jpg\")
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